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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) relies on quantum and classical procedures in or-
der to achieve the growing of a secret random string |the key| known only to the
two parties executing the protocol. Limited intrinsic eciency of the protocol, imperfect
devices and eavesdropping produce errors and information leakage from which the set of
measured signals |the raw key| must be stripped in order to distill a nal, information
theoretically secure, key. The key distillation process is a classical one in which basis
reconciliation, error correction and privacy amplication protocols are applied to the raw
key. This cleaning process is known as information reconciliation and must be done in a
fast and ecient way to avoid cramping the performance of the QKD system. Brassard
and Salvail proposed a very simple and elegant protocol to reconcile keys in the secret-
key agreement context, known as Cascade, that has become the de-facto standard for all
QKD practical implementations. However, it is highly interactive, requiring many com-
munications between the legitimate parties and its eciency is not optimal, imposing an
early limit to the maximum tolerable error rate. In this paper we describe a low-density
parity-check reconciliation protocol that improves signicantly on these problems. The
protocol exhibits better eciency and limits the number of uses of the communications
channel. It is also able to adapt to dierent error rates while remaining ecient, thus
reaching longer distances or higher secure key rate for a given QKD system.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, information reconcilia-
tion, rate-compatible, low-density parity-check codes
Communicated by: to be lled by the Editorial
1 Introduction
A quantum key distribution protocol is composed of two parts: a quantum and a classical
one [1]. The quantum part involves the actual transmission of qubits, its manipulation
and detection, and it is performed using a quantum channel. The classical part is done
through a public, albeit integrity-preserving, classical channel and involves basis recon-
ciliation, error correction and privacy amplication protocols. The quantum part results
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2 Information Reconciliation for QKD
in the production of a raw key at both ends of the quantum channel. The raw key must
be cleaned from all the unavoidable errors produced in this part. These include the
intrinsic ones, due to the limited eciency of the protocol, and those arising either from
the inevitable imperfections in the physical setup or from eavesdropping. Intrinsic errors
are easier to correct and this is usually done by bookkeeping of the detection events
and subsequent discussion over the classical channel about the preparation state of the
qubits leading to the recorded events. For example, in the standard BB84 protocol [2],
half of the qubits detected by Bob will be in a base orthogonal to the one in which they
were prepared by Alice, leading to a 50% of detections that do not directly contribute
bits to the nal secret key. In a real setup, the remaining bits will still be aected from
errors arising either from the physical implementation itself or from an eavesdropper,
these being in principle indistinguishable. The process to clean the key from the errors
is known as information reconciliation and is done through the classical channel.
The existence of optimal, although inecient, protocols leaking a minimum of in-
formation in the process was demonstrated in [3]. There, a practical protocol trading
an acceptable amount of leaked information for eciency was also proposed. This rec-
onciliation protocol, known as Cascade, has become the de-facto standard for all QKD
practical implementations. However, it has several shortcomings that make it less than
ideal under certain situations that are expected to become more common in real world
environments. Work has been done to improve on Cascade [4{7], but none of the resulting
methods have become as widespread.
Recent advances in QKD systems have seen a tremendous increase in key generation
speed [8{10]. Current generation systems can be successfully used over longer distances or
in noisier environments than before, like those arising when integration with conventional
networks is required [11,12]. This changes indicate that the reconciliation protocol must
be ecient at high key and error rates.
Cascade is a highly interactive protocol that requires a high number of uses of the
public channel to proceed. The number of uses raises markedly with the quantum bit
error rate (QBER), thus it is not well suited for next generation QKD systems. From
a practical point of view, the protocol must be implemented using two computers at
both ends of the quantum channel that process the key and communicate through the
public channel. The typical access latencies to the network are much higher than CPU
operations, hence it is easy to produce a bottleneck in highly interactive protocols. In
fact, if a specialised communications network is not used, the communications needs of
Cascade are already the limiting factor in many situations and with current systems,
instead of the much more delicate quantum part. On the other hand, a less than ideal
eciency limits the maximum number of errors that can be corrected without publishing
too much information, thus reducing the performance of the system when working at a
high error rate.
In this paper we describe a reconciliation protocol that overcomes these problems.
The protocol exhibits a better eciency than Cascade, it can be adapted to a varying
QBER with a low information leakage, extending the usable range of the system. It
limits the number of uses of the public channel and its structure allows for a hardware
implementation, avoiding communications and CPU bottlenecks, thus being well suited
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to next generation QKD systems in demanding environments. LDPC codes also have an
structure that make them well suited for hardware implementations
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, the information reconciliation problem
in the secret-key agreement context is described and the current status of error correc-
tion in QKD is discussed. A new Information Reconciliation Protocol able to adapt to
dierent channel parameters is presented and its asymptotic behavior discussed in Sec-
tion 3. In Section 4 the results of a practical implementation of the protocol are shown.
In particular the eciency of the protocol is compared to its optimal theoretical value
and to Cascade.
2 Problem statement
2.1 Information reconciliation
Let Alice and Bob be two parties with access to dependent sources identied by two
random variables, X and Y respectively. Information reconciliation is the process by
which Alice and Bob extract common information from their correlated sources. In a
practical setting Alice and Bob hold x and y, two n-length strings that are the outcome of
X and Y , and they will agree in some string s = f(x;y) through one-way or bidirectional
conversation [13]. The conversation (x;y) is also a function of the outcome strings, and
its quality can be measured by the number of symbols involved in the conversation
M = j(x;y)j.
Now, the problem of encoding correlated sources is a well known problem in infor-
mation theory. To independently encode X and Y at least a rate R  H(X) + H(Y )
is needed. However, in their seminal paper, Slepian and Wolf [14] demonstrated that
to jointly encode both variables it is enough with a rate R  H(X;Y ) even if X and
Y are encoded separately. Moreover, if Y is available at the decoder only a rate of
R  H(XjY ) is needed to encode X (see Fig. 1), which in the information reconciliation
context amounts for the minimum information needed in order to reconcile Alice's and
Bob's strings. To measure the quality of a real reconciliation schema, that in a practical
setting will encode X with a higher rate than H(XjY ), we use the eciency parameter
f  1 dened as:
Ireal = fH(XjY )  Iopt (1)
where Ireal is the information published during the reconciliation process, Iopt is the min-
imum information that would allow to reconcile Alice's and Bob's strings, and H(XjY )
is the conditional Shannon entropy.
However, there are two other parameters to consider when evaluating the quality of
a information reconciliation procedure: that is the computational complexity and the
interactivity. The rst one stresses that a real information reconciliation procedure must
be feasible. Any suciently long random linear code of the appropriate rate could solve
the problem [15], however optimal decoding is in general an NP-hard problem. The
interactivity of a reconciliation protocol has to be taken into account because, specially
in high latency scenarios, the communications overhead can pose a severe burden on the
performance of the QKD protocol.
4 Information Reconciliation for QKD
Fig. 1. Source coding with side information.
In order to evaluate the quality of the reconciliation, we will concentrate in discrete
variable QKD protocols even if the ideas presented here can be easily extrapolated to
other scenarios. Most QKD protocols encode the information in discrete variables [2,16],
although there are many proposals on continuous variable protocols [17{19]. Errors
on the quantum channel are normally uncorrelated and symmetric or, if prior to the
reconciliation Alice and Bob apply a random permutation, they can behave as such [20].
In this situation Alice's and Bob's strings can be regarded as the input and output of a
binary symmetric channel (BSC), characterized by the crossover probability ", and the
eciency parameter f can be described as the relationship between the length of the
conversation M = j(x;y)j and the optimal value N H(XjY ) = N  h("):
f =
M
N  h(") (2)
It was rst shown in [21] that low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes used within
Wyner's coset scheme [15, 22] are a good solution for the compression of binary sources
with side information. LDPC codes [26] are linear codes that have a sparse parity check
matrix. These codes, when decoded with the belief propagation algorithm, can perform
very close to the theoretical limit.
The fundamental idea is to assign each source vector to a bin from a set of 2H(XjY )+
known bins, the encoder describes the bin to the decoder, and the decoder searches for
the source vector inside the described bin. Let x and y be two binary strings of length
n, and C a [n; k] binary linear code specied by its parity matrix H. The syndrome s
of a vector x is the n   k string dened as s = Hx being s = 0 for all the codewords
in C. Each syndrome s denes a coset Cs as the set of all strings, fxg, that verify
Hx = s. Wyner's schema consists in assigning each source vector to one of the cosets of
C. Encoding x amounts then to compute its syndrome, and decoding is simply to nd
the member in Cs closest to y. An LDPC message passing decoder was modied in [21]
to take into account the syndrome decoding proposed by Wyner. This same procedure
can be applied to the QKD scenario.
2.2 Previous work
As mentioned in the introduction, the most widely used and best known protocol for
error correction in the QKD context is Cascade. Proposed by Brassard and Salvail [3],
this protocol runs for a xed number of passes. In each pass, Alice and Bob divide their
strings into blocks of equal length. The initial block length depends on the estimated
error probability, p, and it is doubled when starting a new pass. For each block they
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compute and exchange its parity. A parity mismatch implies an odd number of errors,
and a dichotomic search allows both parties to nd one of the errors. Whenever an error is
found after the rst pass, it uncovers an odd number of errors masked on the preceding
passes and the algorithm returns to correct those errors previously undetected. This
cascading process gives name to the protocol. Several papers propose improvements on
Cascade [4, 5], these papers analyse how the block length is to be chosen and increased
in order to optimise the eciency of the reconciliation, but the main characteristics
remain unaltered. Cascade, although highly interactive, is reasonably ecient and easy
to implement. It is well known and has become the de-facto standard, hence we have
chosen Cascade as the benchmark to compare against.
Winnow [6] is another well know reconciliation protocol in the QKD context, it
requires only two communications between the parties. In the rst communication Alice
and Bob exchange the parities of every block. After that, they exchange the syndrome
of a Hamming code for correcting single errors in each block with a parity mismatch.
The protocol incorporates a privacy maintenance procedure by discarding one bit per
parity revealed (i.e. m bits are discarded when a syndrome of length m is exchanged).
Its main advantage is a reduction on the number of communication needed, however the
eciency of the protocol is worse than that of Cascade in the error range of interest.
Recently, some interesting improvements have been proposed for selecting an optimum
block length in this protocol [7].
Modern coding techniques have not been applied to discrete variable QKD until
recently. LDPC codes were proposed and used on [23]. But as the codes had not been
specically designed for the problem, aside from the inherent advantage of forward error
correction, the eciency was worse than that of Cascade. These codes have been also used
in the context of continuous variable QKD [19]. LDPC codes were rst optimized for the
BSC on [24], and although the results were close to optimal for the designed codes, the
eciency curve exhibited a saw behaviour due to a lack of information rate adaptability
in the proposed procedure [27]. Since the error rate can vary among transmissions, it is
important for a protocol to be able to cope with this change.
3 Rate-compatible reconciliation
Although linear codes are a good solution for the reconciliation problem, since they
can be tailored to a given error rate, their eciency degrades when it is not known
beforehand. This is the case in QKD, where the error rate is an a priori unknown that is
estimated for every exchange. The QBER might vary signicantly in two consecutive key
exchanges, specially when the quantum channel is transported through a shared optical
bre that can be used together with several independent classical or quantum channels
that can add noise. To address this problem there are two dierent options: (i) it is
possible to build a code once the error rate has been estimated, and (ii) a pre-built code
can be modied to adjust its information rate. The computational overhead would make
the rst option almost unfeasible except for very stable quantum channels, something
dicult to achieve in practise and impossible in the case of a shared quantum channel
in a recongurable network environment [11]. In this paper we propose the use of the
second strategy as the easiest and most eective way to obtain a code for the required
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rate, for which we describe a protocol that adapts pre-built codes in real time while
maintaining an eciency close to the optimal value.
3.1 Rate modulation
Puncturing and shortening are two common strategies used to adapt the rate of a linear
code. This process of adapting the information rate of a pre-built code will be referred as
rate modulation. When p punctured symbols of a codeword are removed, a [n; k] code is
converted into a [n p; k] code. Whereas, when shortening, s symbols are removed during
the encoding process, and a [n; k] code is converted into a [n s; k s] code. A graphical
representation, on a Tanner graph, of the procedures just described for puncturing and
shortening and its eects on the rate of the sample code is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Examples of puncturing and shortening strategies applied to a linear code represented by
its Tanner graph. In the puncturing example (left) one symbol is deleted from the word and a [8,4]
code, with rate R = 1=2, is converted to a [7,4], increasing its rate to R = 4=7. In the shortening
example (right), one symbol is deleted from the encoding and the same [8,4] code is converted to
a [7,3] code, the rate now decreases to R = 3=7.
These procedures may be regarded as the transmission of dierent parts of the code-
word over dierent channels (see Fig. 3). Since puncturing is a process by which p
codeword symbols are eliminated, it can be seen as a transmission over a binary erasure
channel (BEC) with erasure probability of 1, BEC(1). Shortening is a process by which
s codeword symbols are known with absolute certainty, as such it can be seen as a trans-
mission over a BEC with erasure probability of 0, BEC(0). The remaining symbols are
transmitted by the real channel which in the present paper can be modelled by a binary
symmetric channel with crossover probability ", BSC(")
Supposing that R0 is the original coding rate, the modulated rate is then calculated
as:
R =
R0   
1      =
k   s
n  p  s (3)
where  and  represent the ratios of information punctured and shortened respectively.
Both strategies, puncturing and shortening, can be applied simultaneously. Given a
[n; k] code and n0  n bits, if puncturing and shortening are applied with a constant
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Fig. 3. Channel model. Puncturing and shortening on a LDPC code results in the division of
the original binary symmetric channel used to reconcile Alice's x string with Bob's y into three
dierent channels: a binary erasure channel with erasure probability of 1 (for the fraction  of
punctured symbols), a BEC with erasure probability of 0 (for the fraction  of shortened symbols)
and a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability " (for the rest of the symbols).
number d of punctured and shortened symbols, a single code can be used to protect the
n0 bits for dierent error rates. There are two consequences of applying a constant d:
(i) there is a limit to the minimum and maximum achievable information rates. These
limits, expressed as a function of  = d=n, dene the correction interval:
0  Rmin = R0   
1    R 
R0
1   = Rmax  1 (4)
(ii) puncturing and shortening procedures cause an eciency loss [28]. Therefore, there
is a tradeo between the achievable information rates and reconciliation eciency.
This eciency loss, caused by high levels of puncturing and shortening, can be avoided
if a set of n codes i with dierent information rates is used: R0(1)  R0(2) 
R0(n). The target error range can then be partitioned into, [Rmin(1); Rmax(1)] [
[Rmin(2); Rmax(2)][ :::[ [Rmin(n); Rmax(n)], not necessarily with the same size. The
number of intervals depends on the width of the error rate range to cover and on the
desired eciency. The compromise between the width of the interval covered and the
achieved eciency in the one code case is transferred to a compromise between e-
ciency and the added complexity of managing several codes. Fig. 4 shows the computed
eciency thresholds for several families of codes with dierent coding rates.
3.2 Protocol
We now proceed to describe a rate-compatible information reconciliation protocol using
puncturing and shortening techniques as described above.
Step 0: Raw key exchange. Alice and Bob obtain a raw key by running a QKD
protocol through a quantum channel (see Section 2). This key exchange may be modelled
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Fig. 4. Eciency thresholds for dierent codes with information rates, R0 = 0:5, 0:6 and 0:7 as a
function of the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Two  values, 0.1 (solid line) and 0.05 (dashed)
have been used to adapt the rate for each code. As a comparison, a single code covering all of the
QBER range of interest, with rate R0 = 0:5 and  = 0:5, is presented to show how the eciency
degrades for high  values, although a broader range is covered. The codes have been optimised
using the density evolution algorithm for the BSC. The Cascade eciency was calculated using the
same sample size (2105). The block size used in the rst step, k1, is given by k1 = d0:73=QBERe
(optimized in [33]) and doubled in every subsequent step kn = 2kn 1. The sawtooth behaviour of
the Cascade eciency reects the points where k1 changes.
D. Elkouss, J. Martinez-Mateo and V. Martin 9
as follows. Alice sends to Bob the string x, an instance of a random variable X, of length
` = n d through a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability ", BSC(") (or a
black box behaving as such). Bob receives the correlated string, y, but with discrepancies
to be removed in the following steps.
Step 1: Pre-conditions. Prior to the key reconciliation process Alice and Bob agree on
the following parameters: (i) a pool of shared codes of length n, constructed for dierent
coding rates; (ii) the size of the sample, t, that will be used to estimate the error rate in
the communication; and (iii) the maximum number of symbols that will be punctured
or shortened to adapt the coding rate, d = p+ s = n.
Step 2: Error rate estimation. Bob chooses randomly a sample of t bits of y, (y),
and sends them and their positions, (y), to Alice through a noiseless channel (i.e. the
public and integrity-preserving channel used in the classic part of a QKD protocol).
Using the positions received from Bob, (y), Alice extracts an equivalent sample in x,
(x), and estimates the crossover probability for the exchanged key by comparing the
two samples:
"0 =
(x) + (y)
t
(5)
Once Alice has estimated "0, she knows the theoretical rate for a punctured and short-
ened code able to correct the string. Now she computes the optimal rate corresponding
to the eciency of the code she is using: R = 1   f("0)h("0); where h is the binary
Shannon entropy function and f the eciency. Then she can derive the optimal values
for puncturing and shortening, p and s respectively, as:
s = d(R0  R(1  d=n))  ne
p = d  s
(6)
Step 3: Coding. Alice creates a string x+ = g(x; "0 ; "0) of size n. The function g
denes the n  d positions to take the values of string x, the p positions to be assigned
random values, and the s positions to have values known by Alice and Bob. The set of
n   d positions, the set of p positions and the set of s positions and their values come
from a synchronised pseudo-random generator. She then sends s(x+), the syndrome of
x+, to Bob as well as the estimated crossover probability "0.
This process can be regarded as jointly coding (and decoding) the original strings
sent through a BSC(QBER) with p bits sent through a binary erasure channel (BEC)
with erasure probability 1, and s bits sent through a noiseless channel (see Fig. 3).
Step 4: Decoding. Bob can reproduce Alice's estimation of the optimal rate R, the
positions of the p punctured bits, and the positions and values of the s shortened bits.
Bob then creates the corresponding string y+ = g(y; "0 ; "0). He should now be able
to decode Alice's codeword with high probability, as the rate has been adapted to the
channel crossover probability. Bob sends an acknowledgement to Alice to indicate if he
successfully recovered x+.
Step 5: (Optional) Interactive decoding. If Bob does not succeed in recovering Alice's
string, Alice can reduce the information rate of the code by revealing some r  p of the
punctured bits on the public channel, that become shortened bits (see Fig. 5). Steps 3
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Fig. 5. Protocol sequence for interactive reconciliation. The gure shows how punctured symbols
are converted into shortened symbols in each round, thus repeating coding and decoding steps
for dierent coding rates. The interactive protocol concludes when the target string has been
reconciled or there are no more punctured symbols to be revealed.
and 4 are then repeated, Alice computes the new syndrome and sends it to Bob, who
tries to decode and send an acknowledge to Alice. Let p(i) and s(i) be the number of
punctured and shortened bits respectively in the i-th round of the proposed protocol,
and r(i+1) the number of punctured bits to be revealed for the next round, the new
proportion of punctured and shortened bits used for the reconciliation are calculated as
p(i+1) = p(i)  r(i+1) and s(i+1) = s(i)+ r(i+1), respectively. These steps can be repeated
while Bob does not nd the correct string and there are punctured bits that have not
been revealed as shortened bits, i.e. while p  0.
4 Simulation results
In this section we discuss the eciency of the rate-compatible information reconciliation
protocol without the interactive decoding step, comparing the results of the protocol to
regular LDPC codes as proposed in [24] and to Cascade. The purpose of this simulations
is to highlight that the proposed protocol extends the working range in QKD, allowing to
distill a key in a wider QBER range than previous information reconciliation protocols.
Fig. 6 shows the eciency, calculated as dened in Eq. (1), in the reconciliation
process simulated for three dierent alternatives: (i) using the Cascade protocol, (ii)
using LDPC codes without adapting the information rate, and (iii) using LDPC codes
adapting the information rate with the rate-compatible protocol proposed here. The
target error range selected is [0:055; 0:11], where a high eciency protocol is a must. Low
QBER rates do not demand a close to optimal eciency since other requisites, such as
the throughput, are more critical in obtaining a high secret key rate. In order to achieve
a eciency close to 1, the error range [0:055; 0:11] has been divided into two correction
intervals: R0(1) = 0:5, R0(2) = 0:6 and  = 0:1. The codes have been constructed
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using families of LDPC codes specically optimised for the BSC. Generating polynomials
of these families can be found in [24], however they were not designed for shortening and
puncturing. Taking into account these parameters in the generating polynomial design
process would allow to cover the whole QBER range with high eciency.
The construction process has been also optimised using a modied progressive edge-
growth algorithm for irregular codes with a detailed check node degree distribution [32].
A codeword length of 2 105 bits has been used.
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Fig. 6. Computed eciency for medium to high error rates, a typical range expected in shared
quantum channel environments, long distances or high losses scenarios, such as in networks, and
where obtaining high eciency is critical. The solid line is the Cascade eciency. Its parameters
are the same than for Fig. 4. The dotted line represents the modulated LDPC thresholds. For
all LDPC results shown here  = 0:1. The long, thick, dashed lines joined by thin dashed lines is
the eciency of an unmodulated code. Short dash and dash-dotted lines are the results for the
modulated codes. Dash-dotted is for a rate R0 = 0:6 and short dash are for R0 = 0:5, triangles
and diamonds are used to mark the computed points. The smooth and ecient behaviour of the
modulated, rate adapted codes, as compared to the unmodulated version is to be noted. The gain
in eciency over Cascade allows for an extended usability range of the system at high QBER.
The results show that there is a small price to pay for the rate adaptation. LDPC
codes without puncturing and shortening behave slightly better near their threshold,
however for the  value chosen the penalty is very small and the rate-compatible protocol
allows to reconcile strings in all the range with f  1:1. The unmodulated LDPC codes
exhibit an undesirable saw behaviour that can lead to eciencies worse than that of
Cascade unless many dierent codes are calculated, incurring in an unacceptable penalty
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in CPU time. The new protocol works at a much better eciency than Cascade, that
performs in all the tested range with f  1:17.
5 Conclusions
We have demonstrated how to adapt an LDPC code for rate compatibility. The capability
to adapt to dierent error rates while minimizing the amount of published information is
an important feature for secret-key reconciliation in the QKD context, specially whenever
it is used in long distance links or in noisy environments such as those arising in shared
optical networks. In these demanding environments high eciency is necessary to distill
a key. The protocol improves on Cascade, allowing to reach eciencies close to one while
limiting the information leakage and having the important practical advantage of low
interactivity: only one message is exchanged by both parties. This high eciency allows
to extend the working range in QKD, that is, it allows to distill a key in a wider QBER
range than previous information reconciliation protocols.
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